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Abstract. Although deep networks achieve strong accuracy on a range
of computer vision benchmarks, they remain vulnerable to adversarial
attacks, where imperceptible input perturbations fool the network. We
present both theoretical and empirical analyses that connect the adver-
sarial robustness of a model to the number of tasks that it is trained
on. Experiments on two datasets show that attack difficulty increases as
the number of target tasks increase. Moreover, our results suggest that
when models are trained on multiple tasks at once, they become more
robust to adversarial attacks on individual tasks. While adversarial de-
fense remains an open challenge, our results suggest that deep networks
are vulnerable partly because they are trained on too few tasks.
Keywords: Multi-task Learning, Adversarial Robustness
1 Introduction
Deep networks obtain high performance in many computer vision tasks [19, 58,
32, 18], yet they remain brittle to adversarial examples. A large body of work has
demonstrated that images with human-imperceptible noise [35, 3, 11, 40] can be
crafted to cause the model to mispredict. This pervasiveness of adversarial ex-
amples exposes key limitations of deep networks, and hampers their deployment
in safety-critical applications, such as autonomous driving.
A growing body of research has been dedicated to answering what causes deep
networks to be fragile to adversarial examples and how to improve robustness
[47, 13, 36, 35, 21, 55, 50, 42, 7, 49]. The investigations center around two factors:
the training data and the optimization procedure. For instance, more training
data – both labeled and unlabeled – improves robustness [43, 52]. It has been
theoretically shown that decreasing the input dimensionality of data improves
robustness [47]. Adversarial training [35] improves robustness by dynamically
augmenting the training data using generated adversarial examples. Similarly,
optimization procedures that regularize the learning specifically with robustness
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Fig. 1: We find that multitask models are more robust against adversarial attacks.
Training a model to solve multiple tasks improves the robustness when one task
is attacked. The middle and right column show predictions for single-task and
multitask models when one task is adversarially attacked.
losses have been proposed [56, 7]. This body of work suggests that the fragility
of deep networks may stem from the training data and optimization procedure.
In this paper, we pursue a new line of investigation: how learning on multiple
tasks affects adversarial robustness. While previous work shows that multitask
learning can improve the performance of specific tasks [4, 48], we show that it
increases robustness too. See Figure 1. Unlike prior work that trades off per-
formance between natural and adversarial examples [51], our work improves
adversarial robustness while also maintaining performance on natural examples.
Using the first order vulnerability of neural networks [47], we theoretically
show that increasing output dimensionality – treating each output dimension as
an individual task – improves the robustness of the entire model. Perturbations
needed to attack multiple output dimensions cancel each other out. We formally
quantify and upper bound how much robustness a multitask model gains against
a multitask attack with increasing output dimensionality.
We further empirically show that multitask learning improves the model
robustness for two classes of attack: both when a single task is attacked or several
tasks are simultaneously attacked. We experiment with up to 11 vision tasks on
two natural image datasets, Cityscapes [8] and Taskonomy [60]. When all tasks
are under attack, multitask learning increases segmentation robustness by up
to 7 points and reduces the error of other tasks up to 60% over baselines. We
compare the robustness of a model trained for a main task with and without an
auxiliary task. Results show that, when the main task is under attack, multitask
learning improves segmentation overlap by up to 6 points and reduces the error
of the other tasks by up to 23%. Moreover, multitask training is a complementary
defense to adversarial training, and it improves both the clean and adversarial
performance of the state-of-the-art, adversarially trained, single-task models.
Code is available at https://github.com/columbia/MTRobust.
Overall, our experiments show that multitask learning improves adversarial
robustness while maintaining most of the the state-of-the-art single-task model
performance. While defending against adversarial attacks remains an open prob-
lem, our results suggest that current deep networks are vulnerable partly because
they are trained for too few tasks.
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2 Related Work
We briefly review related work in multitask learning and adversarial attacks.
Multitask Learning: Multitask learning [4, 15, 10, 25, 48] aims to solve
several tasks at once, and has been used to learn better models for semantic
segmentation [28], depth estimation [53], key-point prediction [23], and object
detection [29]. It is hypothesized that multitask learning improves the perfor-
mance of select tasks by introducing a knowledge-based inductive bias [4]. How-
ever, multi-objective functions are hard to optimize, where researchers design
architectures [20, 24, 34, 38, 30] and optimization procedures [5, 12, 45, 59] for
learning better multitask models. Our work complements this body of work by
linking multitask learning to adversarial robustness.
Adversarial Attacks: Current adversarial attacks manipulate the input
[49, 11, 9, 2, 6, 46, 54, 37] to fool target models. While attacking single output
models [17, 26] is straightforward, Arnab et. al. [2] empirically shows the inher-
ent hardness of attacking segmentation models with dense output. Theoretical
insight of this robustness gain, however, is missing in the literature. While past
theoretical work showed the hardness of multi-objective optimization [16, 44],
we leverage this motivation and prove that multitask models are robust when
tasks are simultaneously attacked. Our work contributes both theoretical and
empirical insights on adversarial attacks through the lens of multitask learning.
Adversarial Robustness: Adversarial training improves models’ robust-
ness against attacks, where the training data is augmented using adversarial sam-
ples [17, 35]. In combination with adversarial training, later works [21, 36, 61, 55]
achieve improved robustness by regularizing the feature representations with ad-
ditional loss, which can be viewed as adding additional tasks. Despite the im-
provement of robustness, adversarially trained models lose significant accuracy
on clean (unperturbed) examples [35, 61, 51]. Moreover, generating adversarial
samples slows down training several-fold, which makes it hard to scale adversar-
ial training to large datasets.
Past work revealed that model robustness is strongly connected to the gra-
dient of the input, where models’ robustness is improved by regularizing the
gradient norm [41, 56, 7]. Parseval [7] regularizes the Lipschitz constant—the
maximum norm of gradient—of the neural network to produce a robust clas-
sifier, but it fails in the presence of batch-normalization layers. [41] decreases
the input gradients norm. These methods can improve the model’s robustness
without compromising clean accuracy. Simon-Gabriel et al. [47] conducted a the-
oretical analysis of the vulnerability of neural network classifiers, and connected
gradient norm and adversarial robustness. Our method enhances robustness by
training a multitask model, which complements both adversarial training [35, 61]
and existing regularization methods [39, 41, 56, 7].
3 Adversarial Setting
The goal of an adversary is to “fool” the target model by adding human-
imperceptible perturbations to its input. We focus on untargeted attacks, which
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are harder to defend against than targeted attacks [14]. We classify adversarial
attacks for a multitask prediction model into two categories: adversarial attacks
that fool more than one task at once (multitask attacks), and adversarial attacks
that fool a specific task (single-task attacks).
3.1 Multitask Learning Objective
Notations. Let x denote an input example, and yc denote the corresponding
ground-truth label for task c. In this work, we focus on multitask learning with
shared parameters [24, 48, 33, 31, 27], where all the tasks share the same “back-
bone network” F (·) as a feature extractor with task-specific decoder networks
Dc(·). The task-specific loss is formulated as:
Lc(x,yc) = `(Dc(F (x)),yc), (1)
where ` is any appropriate loss function. For simplicity, we denote (y1, ...,yM )
as y, where M is the number of tasks. The total loss for multitask learning is a
weighted sum of all the individual losses:
Lall(x,y) =
M∑
c=1
λcLc(x,yc) (2)
For the simplicity of theoretical analysis, we set λc =
1
M for all c = 1, ...,M , such
that
∑M
c=1 λc = 1. In our experiments on real-world datasets, we will adjust the
λc accordingly, following standard practice [48, 27].
3.2 Adversarial Multitask Attack Objective
The goal of a multitask attack is to change multiple output predictions together.
For example, to fool an autonomous driving model, the attacker may need to
deceive both the object classification and depth estimation tasks. Moreover, if we
regard each output pixel of a semantic segmentation task as an individual task,
adversarial attacks on segmentation models need to flip multiple output pixels,
so we consider them as multitask attacks. We also consider other dense output
tasks as a variant of multitask, such as depth estimation, keypoints estimation,
and texture prediction.
In general, given an input example x, the objective function for multitask
attacks against models with multiple outputs is the following:
argmax
xadv
Lall(xadv,y) s.t. ||xadv − x||p ≤ r (3)
where the attacker aims to maximize the joint loss function by finding small
perturbations within a p-norm bounded distance r of the input example. Intu-
itively, a multitask attack is not easy to perform because the attacker needs to
optimize the perturbation to fool each individual task simultaneously. The ro-
bustness of the overall model can be a useful property - for instance, consider an
autonomous-driving model trained for both classification and depth estimation.
If either of the two tasks is attacked, the other can still be relied on to prevent
accidents.
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3.3 Adversarial Single-Task Attack Objective
In contrast to a multitask attack, a single-task attack focuses on a selected
target task. Compared with attacking all tasks at once, this type of attack is
more effective for the target task, since the perturbation can be designed solely
for this task without being limited by other considerations. It is another realistic
type of attack because some tasks are more important than the others for the
attacker. For example, if the attacker successfully subverts the color prediction
for a traffic light, the attacker may cause an accident even if the other tasks
predict correctly. The objective function for single-task attack is formulated as:
argmax
xadv
Lc(xadv,yc), s.t.||xadv − x||p ≤ r (4)
For any given task, this single-task attack is more effective than jointly attacking
the other tasks. We will empirically demonstrate that multitask learning also
improves model robustness against this type of attack in Section 5.
4 Theoretical Analysis
We present theoretical insights into the robustness of multitask models. A preva-
lent formulation of multitask learning work uses shared backbone network with
task-specific branches [33, 31, 27]. We denote the multitask predictor as F and
each individual task predictor as Fc. Prior work [47] showed that the norm of
gradients captures the vulnerability of the model. We thus measure the multi-
task models’ vulnerability with the same metric. Since we are working with deep
networks, we assume all the functions here are differentiable. Details of all proofs
are in the supplementary material.
Definition 1. Given classifier F , input x, output target y, and loss L(x,y) =
`(F (x),y), the feasible adversarial examples lie in a p-norm bounded ball with
radius r, B(x, r) := {xadv, ||xadv − x||p < r}. Then adversarial vulnerability of
a classifier over the whole dataset is
Ex[∆L(x,y, r)] = Ex[ max||δ||p<r |L(x,y)− L(x + δ,y)|]
∆L captures the maximum change of the output loss from arbitrary input change
δ inside the p-norm ball. Intuitively, a robust model should have smaller change
of the loss given any perturbation of the input. Given the adversarial noise is
imperceptible, i.e., r → 0, we can approximate ∆L with a first-order Taylor
expansion [47].
Lemma 1. For a given neural network F that predicts multiple tasks, the ad-
versarial vulnerability is
Ex[∆L(x,y, r)] ≈ Ex [||∂xLall(x,y)||q] · ||δ||p ∝ Ex [||∂xLall(x,y)||q]
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where q is the dual norm of p, which satisfies 1p +
1
q = 1 and 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞.
Without loss of generality, let p = 2 and q = 2. Note that from equation 2, we
get Lall(x,y) =
∑M
c=1
1
MLc(x,yc). Thus we get the following equation:
∂xLall(x,y) = ∂x
M∑
c=1
1
M
Lc(x,yc) = 1
M
M∑
c=1
∂xLc(x,yc) (5)
We denote the gradient for task c as rc, i.e., rc = ∂xLc(x,yc). We propose the
following theory for robustness of different numbers of randomly selected tasks.
Theorem 1. (Adversarial Vulnerability of Model for Multiple Corre-
lated Tasks) If the selected output tasks are correlated with each other such that
the covariance between the gradient of task i and task j is Cov(ri, rj), and the
gradient for each task is i.i.d. with zero mean (because the model is converged),
then adversarial vulnerability of the given model is proportional to√
1 + 2M
∑M
i=1
∑i−1
j=1
Cov(ri,rj)
Cov(ri,ri)
M
where M is the number of output tasks selected.
The idea is that when we select more tasks as attack targets, the gradients
for each of the individual tasks on average cancels out with each other. We define
the joint gradient vector R as follows:
R = ∂xLall(x,y) = 1
M
M∑
c=1
∂xLc(x,yc)
The joint gradient is the sum of gradients from each individual task. We then
obtain the expectation of the L2 norm of the joint gradient:
E(‖R‖22) = E
[
‖ 1
M
M∑
i=1
ri‖22
]
=
1
M2
E
 M∑
i=1
‖ri‖2 + 2
M∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
rirj

=
1
M2
 M∑
i=1
E[Cov(ri, ri)] + 2
M∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
E[Cov(ri, rj)]

The last equation holds due to the 0 mean assumption of the gradient. For
further details of the proof, please see the supplementary material.
Corollary 1. (Adversarial Vulnerability of Model for Multiple Inde-
pendent Tasks) If the output tasks selected are independent of each other, and
the gradient for each task is i.i.d. with zero mean, then the adversarial vulnerabil-
ity of given model is proportional to 1√
M
, where M is the number of independent
output tasks selected.
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Based on the independence assumption, all covariances becomes zero. Thus
Theorem 1 can be simplified as:
E[‖∂xLall(x,y)‖22] = E(‖R‖22) =
1
M
E‖ri‖2 = σ
2
M
∝ 1
M
(6)
Remark 1. By increasing the number of output tasks M , the first order vulner-
ability [47] of network decreases. In the ideal case, if the model has an infinite
number of uncorrelated tasks, then it is impossible to find an adversarial exam-
ples that fools all the tasks.
Remark 2. Theorem 1 studies the robustness for multiple correlated tasks,
which is true for most computer vision tasks. The independent tasks assump-
tion in Corollary 1 is a simplified, idealistic instance of Theorem 1 that upper-
bounds the robustness of models under multitask attacks. Together, Theorem 1
and Corollary 1.1 demonstrate that unless the tasks are 100% correlated (the
same task), multiple tasks together are more robust than each individual one.
Our theoretical analysis shows that more outputs, especially if they are less
correlated, improve the model’s robustness against multitask attacks. Past work
shows that segmentation is inherently robust [2, 6] compared to classification.
Our analysis provides a formal explanation to this inherent robustness because
a segmentation model can be viewed as a multitask model (one task per pixel).
5 Experiments
We validate our analysis with empirical results on the Cityscapes and the Taskon-
omy datasets. We evaluate the robustness of multitask models against two types
of attack: multitask attack (Section 5.3) and single-task attacks (Section 5.4). We
also conduct multitask learning experiments on adversarial training and show
that they are complementary (Section 5.5).
5.1 Datasets
Cityscapes. The Cityscapes dataset [8] consists of images of urban driving
scenes. We study three tasks: semantic segmentation, depth estimation, and
image reconstruction. We use the full resolution (2048×1024) for analyzing pre-
trained state-of-the-art models. We resize the image to 680 × 340 to train our
single task (baseline) and multitask models.1
Taskonomy. The Taskonomy dataset [60] consists of images of indoor scenes.
We train on up to 11 tasks: semantic segmentation (s), depth euclidean esti-
mation (D), depth zbuffer estimation (d), normal (n), edge texture (e), edge
occlusion (E), keypoints 2D (k), keypoints 3D (K), principal curvature (p), re-
shading (r), and image reconstruction (A). We use the “tiny” version of their
dataset splits [1]. We resize the images to 256× 256.
1 We use the same dimension for baselines and ours during comparison because input
dimension impacts robustness [47].
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Ground TruthAttacked Input Images Single-Task (s) Multi-Task (s, d) Multi-Task (s, d, A)
Road Road RoadSidewalk
People People PeopleTree
Road
Sidewalk
RoadRoadSidewalk
Fig. 2: We show model predictions on Cityscapes under multitask attack. The
single-task segmentation model misclassifies the ‘road’ as ‘sidewalk’ under attack,
while the multitask model can still segment it correctly. The multitask models
are more robust than the single-task trained model.
Ground TruthAttacked Input Images Single-Task (d) Multi-Task (s, d) Multi-Task (s, d, A)
Fig. 3: We show depth predictions of multitask models under multitask attacks.
To emphasize the differences, we annotated the figure with red boxes where the
errors are particularly noticeable. The multitask trained model outperforms the
single-task trained model under attack.
5.2 Attack Methods
We evaluate the model robustness with L∞ bounded adversarial attacks, which
is a standard evaluation metric for adversarial robustness [35]. We evaluate with
four different attacks:
FGSM: We evaluate on the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [17], which
generates adversarial examples xadv by xadv = x +  · sign(∇x`(F (x), y)). It is a
single step, non-iterative attack.
PGD: Following the attack setup for segmentation in [2], we use the widely
used attack PGD (Iteratively FGSM with random start [35]), set the number
of iterations of attacks to min( + 4, d1.25e) and step-size α = 1. We choose
the L∞ bound  from {1, 2, 4, 8, 16} where noise is almost imperceptible. Under
 = 4, we also evaluate the robustness using PGD attacks with {10, 20, 50, 100}
steps, which is a stronger attack compared to 5 steps attack used in [2].
MIM: We also evaluate on MIM attack [11], which adds momentum to
iterative attacks to escape local minima and won the NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial
Attack Competition.
Houdini: We evaluate the semantic segmentation task with the state-of-the-
art Houdini attack [6], which directly attacks the evaluation metric, such as the
non-differentiable mIoU criterion (mean Intersection over Union).
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Fig. 4: The effect of output dimensionality and number of tasks on adversarial robust-
ness. We analyzed the pre-trained DRN model on Cityscapes (a,b), and a multitask
model trained on Taskonomy (c). The x-axis of (a,b) represents the output dimension-
ality, the x-axis of (c) shows the combination of multiple tasks. The y-axis of (a,c) is
the L2 norm of the joint gradient and is proportional to the model’s adversarial vul-
nerability. The y-axis of (b) is classification accuracy. The robust performances for (c)
are shown in Fig 5. Increasing the output dimensionality or number of tasks improves
the model’s robustness.
We do not use the DAG [54] attack for segmentation because it is an unre-
stricted attack without controlling L∞ bound. For all the iterative attacks, the
step size is 1.
5.3 Multitask Models Against Multitask Attack
High Output Dimensionality as Multitask. Our experiment first studies
the effect of a higher number of output dimensions on adversarial robustness. As
an example, we use semantic segmentation. The experiment uses a pre-trained
Dilated Residual Network (DRN-105) [57, 58] model on the Cityscapes dataset.
To obtain the given output dimensionality, we randomly select a subset of pix-
els from the model output. We mitigate the randomness of the sampling by
averaging the results over 20 random samples. Random sampling is a general
dimension reduction method, which preserves the correlation and structure for
high dimensional, structured data [22]. Figure 4a shows that the model’s vul-
nerability (as measured by the norm of the gradients) decreases as the number
of output dimension increases, which validates Theorem 1.
Besides the norm of gradient, we measure the performance under FGSM
[17] and PGD [35] adversarial attacks, and show that it improves as output
dimensionality increases (Figure 4b). Notice when few pixels are selected, the
robustness gains are faster. This is because with fewer pixels: (1) the marginal
gain of the inverse function is larger; and (2) the select pixels are sparse and
tend to be far away and uncorrelated to each other. The correlation between
the output pixels compounds as more nearby pixels are selected, which slows
down the improvements to robustness. The results demonstrate that models with
higher output dimension/diversity are inherently more robust against adversarial
attacks, consistent with the observation in [2, 6] and our Theorem 1.
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Fig. 5: Adversarial robustness against multitask attack on Taskonomy dataset. The
x-axis is the attack strength, ranging from no attack (clean) to the strongest attack
( = 16 PGD). For each subfigure, the y-axis shows the performance of one task under
multitask attack. ↑ means the higher, the better. ↓ means the lower, the better. The
multitask model names are in the legend, we refer to the task by their initials, e.g.,
‘sde’ means the model is trained on segmentation, depth, and edge simultaneously.
The blue line is the single-task baseline performance, the other lines are multitask
performance. The figures show that it is hard to attack all the tasks in a multitask model
simultaneously. Thus multitask models are more robust against multitask attacks.
Number of Tasks. We now consider the case where the number of tasks
increases, which is a second factor that increases output dimensionality. We
evaluate the robustness of multitask models on the Cityscapes and Taskonomy
datasets. We equally train all the tasks with the shared backbone architecture
mentioned in Section 3. On Cityscapes, we use DRN-105 model as the architec-
ture for encoder and decoder; on Taskonomy, we use Resnet-18 [60]. Each task
has its own decoder. For the Cityscapes dataset, we start with training only the
semantic segmentation task, then add the depth estimation and input recon-
struction task. For the Taskonomy dataset, following the setup in [48], we start
with only semantic segmentation, and add depth estimation, normal, keypoints
2D, edge texture, and reshading tasks to the model one by one. In our figures
and tables, we refer to these tasks by the task’s first letter.
Figure 4c shows the L2 norm of the joint gradient for many tasks, which
measures the adversarial vulnerability. Overall, as we add more tasks, the norm
of the joint gradient decreases, indicating improvement to robustness [47]. The
only exception is the depth estimation task, which we believe is due to the large
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Fig. 6: Performance of single-task attack for multitask models trained on Cityscapes.
We show segmentation under attack for single-task and three multitask models. The
multitask trained model out-performs the single-task trained model.
range of values (0 to +∞) that its outputs take. Empirically, a larger output
range leads to a larger loss, which implies a larger gradient value.
We additionally measure the robust performance on different multitask mod-
els under multitask attacks. Following the setup in [2], we enumerate the  of the
L∞ attack from 1 to 16. Figure 5 shows the robustness of multitask models us-
ing Taskonomy, where the adversarial robustness of multitask models are better
than single-task models, even if the clean performance of multitask models may
be lower. We also observe some tasks gain more robustness compared to other
tasks when they are attacked together, which suggests some tasks are inherently
harder to attack. Overall, the attacker cannot simultaneously attack all the tasks
successfully, which results in improved overall robustness of multitask models.
In Table 1, we observe the same improvement on Cityscapes. Qualitative results
are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Please see the supplemental material for
additional results.
5.4 Multitask Models Against Single-Task Attacks
Following the setup for multitask learning in [33, 31, 27], we train the multitask
models using a main task and auxiliary tasks, where we use λ = 1 for the main
task and λa for the auxiliary tasks. We then evaluate the robustness of the
main task under single-task attacks. On Cityscapes, the main and the auxiliary
tasks share 16 layers of an encoding backbone network. The decoding network for
Baseline Multitask
Training Tasks s sd sdA
Clean SemSeg ↑ 44.77 46.53 45.82
PGD SemSeg ↑ 15.75 16.01 16.36
Baseline Multitask
Training Tasks d sd sdA
Clean Depth ↓ 1.82 1.780 1.96
PGD Depth ↓ 6.81 6.08 5.81
Table 1: The models’ performances under multitask PGD attack and clean images on
Cityscapes using DRN-D-105 [58] . The bold demonstrate the better performance for
each row, underline shows inferior results of multitask learning. The results show that
multitask models are overall more robust under multitask attack.
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SemSeg mIoU Score ↑ Depth Abs Error ↓
Baseline Multitask Learning Baseline Multitask Learning
Training Tasks −→ s sd sA sdA d ds dA dAs
λa 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.1 0.1 0.01
Clean 48.58 48.61 49.61 48.19 1.799 1.792 1.823 1.798
A
tt
a
ck
s
FGSM 26.35 26.28 26.79 26.71 3.16 3.01 3.00 3.24
PGD10 13.04 13.64 14.76 14.48 6.96 6.15 6.03 6.59
PGD20 11.41 11.98 12.79 12.73 8.81 7.70 7.64 8.38
PGD50 10.49 10.95 11.68 11.86 10.23 9.07 9.12 9.81
PGD100 10.15 10.51 11.22 11.52 10.8 9.69 9.74 10.41
MIM100 9.90 10.17 10.93 11.24 12.04 10.72 10.97 11.69
Houdini100 5.04 5.14 6.24 6.21 - - - -
Table 2: Model’s robust performance under L∞ = 4 bounded single-task attacks on
Cityscapes. Each column is a DRN-22 model trained on a different combination of
tasks, where “s,”“d,”and“A”denote segmentation, depth, and auto-encoder, respec-
tively. ↑ means the higher, the better. ↓ means the lower, the better. Bold in each
row, shows the best performance under the same attack. Multitask learning models
out-perform single-task models except for the underlined ones. While nearly maintain-
ing the performance on clean examples, multitask models are consistently more robust
under strong adversarial attacks.
each individual task has 6 layers. For all the models, we train for 200 epochs. For
adversarial robustness evaluation, we use strong attacks including PGD100 and
MIM100 for attacking the segmentation accuracy2, and use 100 steps Houdini
[6] to attack the non-differentiable mIoU of the Segmentation model directly.
We do not use Houdini to attack the depth because the L1 loss for depth is
differentiable and does not need any surrogate loss. The results in Table 2 show
that multitask learning improves the segmentation mIoU by 1.2 points and the
performance of depth estimation by 11% under attack, while maintaining the
performance on most of the clean examples. Qualitative results are in Figure 6.
On the Taskonomy dataset, we conduct experiments on 11 tasks. Following
the setup in [48], we use ResNet-18 [19] as the shared encoding network, where
each individual task has its own prediction network using the encoded represen-
tation. We train single-task models for each of the 11 tasks as baselines. We train
a total of 110 multitask models — each main task combined with 10 different
auxilliary tasks — for 11 main tasks. We evaluate both the clean performance
and adversarial performance. λa is either 0.1 or 0.01 based on the tasks. We use
PGD attacks bounded with L∞ = 4 with 50 steps, where the step size is 1. The
attack performance plateaus for more steps. Figure 7 shows the performance
of the main task on both clean and adversarial examples. While maintaining
the performance on clean examples (average improvement of 4.7%), multitask
learning improves 90/110 the models’ performance under attacks, by an average
of 10.23% relative improvement. Our results show that one major advantage of
2 Suffixed number indicates number of steps for attack
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(b) Performance on Clean Examples
Fig. 7: We consider models trained on two tasks. In each matrix, the rows show the first
training task and the testing task. The columns show the auxiliary training task. The
first column without color shows the absolute value for the baseline model (single-task).
The middle colored columns show the relative improvement of multitask models over
the single-task model in percentage. The last colored column shows the average relative
improvement. We show results for both (a) adversarial and (b) clean performance.
Multitask learning improves the performance on clean examples for 70/110 cases, and
the performance on adversarial examples for 90/110 cases. While multitask training
does not always improve clean performance, we show multitask learning provides more
gains for adversarial performance.
multitask learning, which to our knowledge is previously unknown, is that it
improves the model’s robustness under adversarial attacks.
5.5 Multitask Learning Complements Adversarial Training
We study whether multitask learning helps adversarial robust training. We use
DRN-22 on the Cityscapes dataset, and train both single-task and multitask
models for 200 epoch under the same setup. The single-task model follows the
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SemSeg mIoU Score ↑ Depth Abs Error ↓
Baseline Multitask Learning Baseline Multitask Learning
Training Tasks −→ s sd sA sdA d ds dA dAs
Clean 41.95 43.27 43.65 43.26 2.24 2.07 2.15 2.15
A
tt
a
ck
s PGD50 19.73 22.08 20.45 21.93 2.85 2.61 2.75 2.67
PGD100 19.63 21.96 20.31 21.83 2.85 2.61 2.75 2.67
MIM100 19.54 21.89 20.20 21.74 2.85 2.61 2.75 2.67
Houdini100 17.05 19.45 17.36 19.16 - - - -
Table 3: Adversarial robustness of adversarial training models under L∞ = 4 bounded
attacks on Cityscapes. Each column is a model trained on a different combination
of tasks. “s,”“d,”and“A”denote segmentation, depth, and auto-encoder respectively. ↑
indicates the higher, the better. The ↓ indicates the lower, the better. Bold shows the
best performance of the same task for each row. Multitask learning improves both the
clean performance and robustness upon single-task learning.
standard adversarial training algorithm, where we train the model on the gener-
ated single-task (segmentation) adversarial attacks. For the multitask adversarial
training, we train it on the generated multitask attack images for both semantic
segmentation and the auxiliary task. Details are in the supplementary material.
Table 3 shows that multitask learning improves the robust performance of both
clean examples and adversarial examples, where segmentation mIoU improves
by 2.40 points and depth improves by 8.4%.
6 Conclusion
The widening deployment of machine learning in real-world applications calls for
versatile models that solve multiple tasks or produce high-dimensional outputs.
Our theoretical analysis explains that versatile models are inherently more ro-
bust than models with fewer output dimensions. Our experiments on real-world
datasets and common computer vision tasks measure improvements in adversar-
ial robustness under attacks. Our work is the first to connect this vulnerability
with multitask learning and hint towards a new direction of research to under-
stand and mitigate this fragility.
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